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We investigate the link between productivity of firms and their sourcing behavior. Following 
Antràs & Helpman (2004) we distinguish between domestic and foreign sourcing, as well as 
between outsourcing and vertical integration. A firm’s choice is driven by a hold-up problem 
caused by lack of enforceable contracts. We use Spanish firm-level data to examine the 
productivity premia associated with the different sourcing strategies. We find strong empirical 
support for the predictions of the model. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the past decade, trade theory has turned micro: The individual firm has entered the stage of 
analysis. Of course, this is of interest only to the extent that firms are not entirely symmetric. We 
have ample evidence indicating that firms exhibit substantial heterogeneity in the degree, as well as 
the organizational form of internationalization. Importantly, this heterogeneity is not random, but 
features a characteristic pattern. The general picture is one of so-called “exporter-premia”, whereby 
exporting firms show higher performance in several dimensions than non-exporting firms, most 
notably in the level of productivity; see Bernard et al. (2007) for a convenient survey. A similar 
pattern is also observed for horizontal FDI; see Helpman et al. (2004) and Helpman (2006). The 
dominant theoretical explanation of such heterogeneity in exports and FDI invokes the celebrated 
model of firm heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition framework developed in Melitz (2003). 
This explanation features self-selection of firms based on productivity. In other words, the causation 
runs from productivity to exports or FDI. However, such causality is more difficult to establish 
empirically than the pattern of heterogeneity as such; see Bernard et al. (1999). Although the bulk of 
the literature focuses on exports and horizontal FDI, Bernard et al. (2007) find a picture of premia 
also on the import side. In other words, more productive firms tend to do both, more exporting and 
more importing than less productive firms. Any theoretical explanation for an “importer premium” 
must address firms’ sourcing behavior. Production requires intermediate inputs, and in many cases 
these inputs may be obtained either domestically or through imports. Moreover, provision of 
intermediates may take different organizational forms, such as arms-length market transactions or 
vertical integration within a firm’s own boundary. In other words, a firm’s sourcing decision for 
intermediates involves a location dimension (domestic or offshore) and an organizational 
dimension (markets or in-house). Do we find a characteristic pattern performance premia across 
these sourcing modes? What does this pattern look like? How can it be explained? 
Drawing on Antràs (2003) as well as Melitz (2003), Antràs & Helpman (2004) develop a model 
of global sourcing that addresses both, the location of sourcing and its organizational mode. The 
model emphasizes a hold-up problem that arises if the inputs in question are relationship-specific 
and cannot be contracted. As a result, the firm and the input supplier face the need to negotiate on 
dividing the surplus from the relationship. Institutional environments in developed economies 
typically offer several organizational forms that firms may rely on for their sourcing strategies. 3 
 
Drawing on Grossman & Hart (1986), Antràs & Helpman (2004) assume that firms may choose 
between two forms, one relying on arms-length transactions, the other relying on so-called vertical 
integration. The two forms differ in the outside options of the two negotiating parties, whereby 
vertical integration gives the firm a property right in the input. This enhances the firm’s outside 
option when negotiating with the supplier about sharing the fruits of the relationship, but it also 
reduces the incentive for the input supplier to invest in that relationship. This is the key trade-off 
modeled in Antràs & Helpman (2004). The model generates relatively sharp predictions where a 
firm’s sourcing strategy is determined by its productivity as well as certain structural characteristics 
of the underlying production relationship. Antràs & Helpman (2004) assume complete lack of 
contractibility, which may risk overdoing the point. In Antràs & Helpman (2008), the model is 
extended to allow for a varying degree of contractibility over a continuum of tasks required for each 
of the two inputs in question. The extended model generates additional predictions, but the spirit of 
the original model survives without a stain. 
Empirical evidence on firm heterogeneity in importing and sourcing is less abundant than 
evidence on exports and horizontal FDI. The reason has to do with data limitations. Offshoring is 
notoriously difficult to measure. This is aggravated by the need to observe the prevalence of 
organizational forms, if we aim at a comprehensive empirical investigation that covers both 
dimensions of sourcing. As a result, empirical analysis seems inherently more challenging in this 
line of research than for the export side, as suggested by Greenaway and Kneller (2007, p.F156). No 
wonder, then, that the literature on firm heterogeneity in trade has mainly focused on exports and 
FDI, and less on imports and sourcing. Existing empirical work has mostly focused on the 
organizational form of offshoring, thus ignoring domestic sourcing strategies; see Defever & 
Toubal (2007) and Nunn & Trefler (2008). However, a consistent investigation of 
“importer-premia”, or a full test of the Antràs-Helpman model, requires a comprehensive approach 
that includes observing both, domestic sourcing as well as import sourcing.  
In this paper, we present evidence on the pattern of sourcing strategies of manufacturing firms 
drawing on Spanish firm-level data. A crucial feature of our data is that they allow us to consistently 
investigate both sourcing dimensions (location and organizational form) in a unified setting. 
Tomiura (2007) provides mainly evidence on both dimensions from a Japanese data set, without 
investigating performance premia associated with different sourcing modes, and without observing 
the organizational dimension for domestic sourcing. A recent study by Federico (2009), relying on 4 
 
Italian firm-level data, does observe all possible dimensions, and it looks at the relationship between 
firm productivity and sourcing behavior. However, this relationship is inherently more complex in 
this setup than in the standard case because of the hold-up problem mentioned above. For this 
reason, we first present a theoretical model of the hold-up problem that highlights how firm 
productivity interacts with structural characteristics of the underlying production relationship in 
determining a firm’s sourcing strategy. 
Given this interaction, can we expect a clear pattern looking at "productivity-premia” alone? 
Our theoretical section tells us we can do so only up to a point. In other words, we need to bring in 
certain controls. It also tells us that we need to be very cautious about whether the units of 
observation are indeed firms as defined in the model. Theory defines the firm as a true headquarter 
that decides about the organizational form of sourcing. We must therefore avoid our data to be 
“contaminated” by firms who are in fact positioned at the opposite side of the hold-up problem, i.e., 
purchasing an input from a foreign or domestic headquarter. Our data set is unique in that it allows 
us to clearly separate firms that correspond to the theoretical notion of a headquarter from those who 
are themselves subsidiaries of foreign or domestic parental companies. 
Our paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the essentials of the hold-up model of 
global sourcing, aiming at a rigorous derivation of the “sourcing-premia” implied by this model. In 
section three, we then describe our data set and present a few descriptive statistics. Section four 
comes in two parts. First, we compare the true productivity distributions of subsets of firms that 
differ in their sourcing strategies. More specifically, we compare firms engaged in domestic 
outsourcing versus domestic vertical integration, as well as firms engaged in foreign outsourcing 
versus foreign vertical integration. A final comparison is between firms with offshore sourcing 
(whether at arms-length or with vertical integration) versus domestic sourcing. Secondly, we 
estimate “sourcing-premia” by regressing firm productivity on dominant sourcing strategies, as well 
as a host of controls. Section five concludes with a brief summary and outlook on open questions 
and further research. 
2.  A theory of sourcing without contractibility 
Stripped down to its bare bones, what are the essentials of the “hold-up model” of global sourcing? 
A key tenet of all models in the spirit of Antràs (2003) is that production requires essential inputs 
that the firm cannot generate within its firm (or command) hierarchy, but must be obtained from a 5 
 
supplier. Importantly, the line separating “firm-inputs” and “supplier-inputs” is exogenous to the 
model. What is endogenous is the organizational mode and location of the “supplier-input”. 
Alternative modes of organization differ in their implications for the incentive structure for the firm 
and the input supplier. Thus, by choosing a specific organizational mode the firm may alleviate the 
problem of distorted input levels. More specifically, vertical integration lowers the incentive for the 
input supplier which may, therefore, not be an optimal strategy if the input looms large in the 
production relationship. In Antràs & Helpman (2004,2008), this mechanism is extended to include 
firm heterogeneity. It turns out that firms select into different sourcing strategies, based on their 
productivity in interaction with importance of “firm inputs” relative to “supplier inputs” in the 
production relationship. 
2.1  The framework 
There are two types of agents, firms and input suppliers. Firms have access to some market where 
they raise revenue from selling final goods which are produced from two essential inputs that are 
provided, respectively, by the firms themselves (the so-called “headquarter service”) and by the 
input suppliers. Input suppliers may either be located in the domestic economy or in the foreign 
economy, but all firms are assumed to be located in the domestic economy. Firms are unable to 
produce non-headquarter inputs which we shall henceforth call supplier-inputs. Therefore, they 
must always resort to input suppliers in order to generate revenue at all. In turn, production of both, 
the headquarter- and the supplier input, requires primary factors which must be purchased in the 
factor market of the country where the input provider is located. 
Final goods feature product differentiation along the lines of Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). 
Importantly, each firm produces its own distinct brand which affords market power. However, it 
also implies that inputs must be provided in a unique specification for each brand. We assume 
extreme specificity, so that any input, once provided, has economic value only from production and 
sale of the corresponding final good. This is called relationship-specificity. Moreover, we assume 
that the quality and/or quantity of input provision cannot be verified by a third party, so that firms 
and input suppliers cannot write enforceable contracts for input provision. Therefore, firms and 
input suppliers must ensure corresponding specifications, and when deciding about the amounts of 
labor to invest into generating their respective inputs, they expect to be pitted against each other in a 
negotiation about how to share the revenue from selling the output generated by their specific 6 
 
inputs. Negotiation is assumed to take the form of Nash-bargaining, with a bargaining power equal 
to    for the firm, and 1   for the input supplier. In addition to the variable cost of input 
provision, raising revenue from the production relationship requires an organizational effort which 
causes a fixed cost. As we shall detail below, the magnitude of this cost is assumed to differ across 
organizational forms as well as between locations of input provision.  
For simplicity, we assume that in both countries input suppliers are in infinitely elastic supply, 
with zero outside options. Thus, any input-supplier is willing to engage in a production relationship 
with a firm, if and only if she may expect to obtain a share of the revenue that is at least equal to the 
cost of input provision. We assume perfect competition among input suppliers, so that in 
equilibrium the expected profit from participating in production as an input-supplier must be zero. A 
firm may thus attract a suitable input supplier by charging a participation fee which is equal to the 
surplus of the supplier’s expected revenue-share over the cost for input provision. Note that this 
surplus need not be positive. If it is negative, then the firm must pay a participation price to the 
input-supplier.  
The cost of input provision for the input supplier is determined by domestic factor prices or 
foreign factor prices, depending on whether a firm chooses a domestic or foreign supplier. This is 
the location dimension mentioned in the introduction. We assume a foreign location advantage for 
the supplier-input, which means that the foreign unit-cost of production is lower than the unit-cost 
under domestic factor prices. In the domestic economy, there is an infinitely elastic supply of 
potential firms that may enter the market, with an uncertain total productivity of the relationship 
between the two inputs. Firm entry evolves as in Melitz (2003), meaning that entry is governed by a 
sunk entry cost and zero expected profits from a potential relationship with an input supplier.  
A fundamental premise of this type of models is that there is a key asymmetry between firms 
and input suppliers. In the very first stage of decision making, firms may “purchase” an outside 
option for the ex-post Nash-bargaining, which takes the form of property rights in the 
supplier-input. Following Antràs & Helpman (2004), we call this vertical integration, but it is 
important to bear in mind that it does not mean the firm has command over the entire input 
provision. The meaning is as follows: If bargaining breaks down, the firm may invoke a property 
right on the supplier-input and still sell the output. However, securing this outside option involves 
two types of cost. First, there is an iceberg-type cost of invoking property rights in that the revenue 7 
 
accruing to the firm is only a fraction   of market revenue.
1 And secondly, the organizational fixed 
cost to the firm is higher with vertical integration than without. We call an organizational form of 
input provision that does not involve any acquisition of property rights outsourcing.  
The organizational cost is likely to be larger if the firm relies on a foreign input supplier, 
whatever the organizational form of sourcing. Antràs & Helpman (2004) make further assumptions 
that ultimately lead to following ranking of the fixed organizational cost:                      , 
whereby a superscript   and   indicate vertical integration and outsourcing, respectively, while   
and   indicate a foreign or domestic input supplier. All organizational costs are expressed in units 
of the (domestic) headquarter-input. One may also assume that   is larger for an input provided 
domestically:        . Notice that this share is always zero if the firm chooses outsourcing. 
With this legal environment of property rights, the firm may influence the expected pay-off 
from ex-post Nash-bargaining through an ex-ante choice of its organizational form of sourcing. 
More specifically, with vertical integration the share of revenue that accrues to the firm is equal to 
 ℓ     ℓ     1   ℓ , and with outsourcing it is equal to                ℓ . Notice that 
1   ℓ times the revenue to be generated from the market represents the “gains from trade”, trade 
meaning completion of the production relationship through successful Nash-bargaining.  
2.2  Decision making 
Decision making takes place in a multi-stage manner. In a first step, firms enter the market in order 
to find out about their productivity level   (TFP). In stage 2, conditional upon   being large 
enough to avoid losses from the subsequent stages,
2 each firm decides about its optimal sourcing 
strategy, which means the simultaneous choice of a location ℓ   or  ℓ   and  an 
organizational form      or     . In the third stage, the two input providers (i.e., the firm and 
the supplier) choose levels of their inputs that maximize the difference between their expected 
shares of revenue, to be generated from the relationship, and their respective cost of input provision. 
Expected shares depend on the anticipated Nash-bargaining power and the outside options of the 
two parties. Importantly, the revenue depends on the levels of each input chosen. Stage 4 then 
                                                 
1 Antràs & Helpman (2004) assume that the iceberg-cost parameter applies to the quantity of the final good 
produced. But this translates into an iceberg-cost parameter for revenue in a straightforward way, depending 
on the details of the revenue function that are not important for our purpose. 
 
2 Details of this first stage are as in Melitz (2003), and will not be looked at in detail here. 8 
 
involves production of the final good, with the revenue shared among the two input providers 
according to the Nash-bargaining solution. When contemplating entry, a potential firm anticipates 
its optimal choice of an organizational form in stage 2, which in turn will anticipate the optimal 
input levels emerging in stage 3. Thus, the sourcing strategy chosen is an integral part of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In the following, we focus on stages 2 through 4 of decision making, 
employing the usual backward induction.
3  
Revenue (stage 4): Under the above assumptions, revenue   is concave in  , the quantity of the 
final good produced: 
                with          ,       ( 1 )  
The first expression follows from Dixit-Stiglitz-type product differentiation, with an elasticity of 
substitution equal to 1  1       ⁄ , whereby 0   1 . In the second expression,    ,   is a 
linearly homogeneous production function for the final good, with input levels   and   for the 
headquarter service and the supplier-input, respectively, and   as the firm-specific TFP-level. In 
the sequel, we denote the elasticity of   with respect to   by  . Given linear homogeneity, the 
elasticity with respect to   is equal to 1  .  
Input levels (stage 3): Input-providers simultaneously, but independently, choose input levels   
and   that maximize                 and  1               ℓ  , respectively, where ℓ 
denotes the location of the input supplier, and the terms    ·  and    ·  denote minimum 
unit-cost for the headquarter- and supplier-input, respectively, as functions of factor prices  ℓ. The 
parameter   denotes the revenue share accruing to the firm in ex-post Nash-bargaining. This 
depends on organizational choice       ,   . However, for the time being we ignore this 
dependency, in order to better grasp the strategic role of this share. It can be shown that the optimal 
input levels (indicated by an asterisk) satisfy  
                       and          1       1       ℓ    (2) 
In this equation,    denotes the relationship-specific total revenue deriving from input levels    
and   , determined simultaneously in this stage of decision making. The lack of contractibility 
introduces a distortion, relative to the environment with ex-ante enforceable contracts. Both inputs 
                                                 
3 For the first stage of firm entry and a “general equilibrium” embedment of this sector, with a second 
numéraire sector, see Antràs & Helpman (2004). 9 
 
are provided in less than optimal amounts, whereby the share parameter   determines the distortion 
(under-provision) of the headquarter input, relative to the supplier-input. 
Organizational form (stage 2): In addition to the input levels    and   , the firm’s entire profit 
from the relationship depends on the participation fee that it may charge (or has to pay) the input 
supplier, as well as on the fixed organizational cost it has to bear. The participation fee is equal to 
 1            ℓ   , which may be zero, positive, or negative. Equilibrium firm profits now 
emerge as 
Π                        ℓ             ℓ  
        1 γ α η  1 γ  α 1 η             ℓ     ( 3 )  
where  ℓ  denotes the corresponding organizational fixed cost in units of domestic labor. The 
second line uses the above first-order conditions on the two input levels. It is now crucial to 
recognize that    depends on the organizational choice through the above mentioned property 
rights that may be acquired through vertical integration. Using    to denote the unit-cost function 
dual to    ,  , we may write 
      
 
      
      
  ,
    ℓ 
      
  /     
       ( 4 )  
Notice that the elasticity of    with respect to        is equal to  , and analogously for the other 
input cost. Notice also that the lack of complete contracts affects maximum revenue that can be 
generated from the final goods market in a way which is equivalent to a tax on the two inputs. If 
  1 / 2 , then the “equivalent tax” also distorts the input mix. Equilibrium firm profits now emerge 
as 
Π     ℓ                  ℓ       ( 5 )  
w h e r e               Z ℓ   
A                   
    
    D 
  ,
    ℓ 
       
 
   
          6    
In stage 2 of the game, the firm chooses a sourcing strategy ℓ     ,    and       ,     that 
maximizes profits Π . 10 
 
2.3  Organizational modes of sourcing  
Equation (5) depicts a firm’s profits from a production relationship as a linear function of Θ 
  /     . Remember that 0   1 , hence Θ is unambiguously increasing in the productivity 
level  . The negative intercept in (5) represents the fixed organizational cost  ℓ  and the domestic 
unit-cost of the headquarter input. In turn, equation (6) reveals the slope of this line as a relatively 
complex function of the expected revenue share parameter   and the two countries’ unit-cost for 
the inputs. Together, equations (5) and (6) reveal how firm productivity interacts with other 
characteristics of the production relationship in determining maximum firm profits. Setting demand 
characteristics ( , ) aside, these are the revenue share  , reflecting the bargaining situation that 
stems from lack of enforceable contracts, the share of the firm’s own input ( ), and the factor 
intensities of the two inputs, reflected in        and     ℓ . 
Up to this point we have not considered the choice of organizational form for the production 
relationship and the location of the input-supplier. How does firm productivity impact on these 
choices? We first discuss the organizational mode for a given location of supply. For any given 
sourcing market and for given characteristics of the production relationship ( ,  , the slope term 
 ℓ   tells us how differences in firm productivity Θ translate into differences in maximum 
operating profits. If there are fixed costs, these need to surpass a certain threshold for the firm to 
remain in the market. But this is not what we want to focus on now. We want to consider the role 
that   and   play for the slope of the profit function. Antràs & Helpman (2004) suggest that the 
organizational dimension of the sourcing strategy is best understood by first considering the effect 
of an unrestricted variation of the share parameter    on a firm’s profit from the relationship with 
an input-supplier. Unrestricted simply means that the firm can pick   at will. It is obvious that a 
firm should not expect positive profits if its bargaining power approaches zero,      0 . 
Remembering that the lack of enforceable contracts is equivalent to a tax on the two inputs, this case 
is recognized as an infinite “equivalent tax” on the headquarter-input, which wipes out all firm 
profits. Perhaps less obviously, a firm could not expect positive profits also if   1 . Intuitively, in 
this case it would simply lack an essential input, since the input supplier lacks any incentive to 
invest in the relationship at all. Formally, in either of the two cases   0  and   1  we have 
   ·    ∞, provided that 0   1 , and from (5) and (6) a firm’s maximum profit function would 
be flat at         ℓ . Independent of its productivity level, a firm would make negative 11 
 
maximum profits.  
All of this suggests that there should be a level of   which maximizes the slope of our 
profit-line. We now call this the optimal value of  , always bearing in mind that, ultimately, the 
choice of   will be subject to institutional restrictions. We shall turn to the equilibrium value of   
below. Intuitively, the incentive problem of a high   is the more severe, the more important the 
supplier input for the relationship, as measured by the elasticity 1  . Put differently, for a given 
sourcing location, the optimal firm-share   should be increasing in  , the elasticity of the output   
with respect to the headquarter service. Antràs & Helpman (2004) derive such a monotonic 
relationship for the optimal level of   as a function of  . Let us denote this relationship by     , 
with   0 . It is interesting to note that the optimal value of   is independent of the unit-cost 
functions for the two inputs. Moreover, both      and  ℓ   are independent of the firm’s 
productivity level  . Importantly, however, the level of the slope  ℓ  that is reached at the optimal 
value of   does depend on the unit-cost    ·  and, thus, on the extent of the foreign cost 
advantage. For this reason, an increase in the firm’s revenue share   also implies a variation in the 
slope   ℓ    which comes about through the “equivalent tax” on the supplier-input in 
c  wℓ   1 γ   ⁄ . It is also worth noting that, given a certain pattern of factor price differences 
between the two countries, the extent of the foreign cost advantage depends on the factor intensity of 
the supplier-input. 
Next, we must recognize that the bargaining and institutional environment typically requires a 
discrete choice among limited set of options, rather than unconstrained optimization on  . In our 
case, a firm has but two options. Vertical integration gives a revenue share equal to  ℓ     ℓ  
  1  ℓ , depending on the sourcing location. Outsourcing ties this share down to     ℓ , 
independent of the sourcing location.  
We proceed by first conditioning the firm’s organizational choice on a given sourcing location 
ℓ   ,  . There is a critical value of    , implicitly defined through             ℓ , such that for 
any          firms will never choose vertical integration, whatever their productivity, and 
independently of the fixed organizational cost. The supplier-input is simply too important in the 
production relationship. Ideally, the firm would even want to enhance the input-supplier’s incentive 




There is a further critical value   ℓ which is implicitly defined by     ℓ    ℓ     1   ℓ . It 
might be tempting to argue that for any elasticity value       ℓ the firm should choose vertical 
integration. However, this is not true. While it is true that in such industries the profit line has a 
larger slope for vertical integration than for outsourcing, i.e.,  ℓ     ℓ  , this does not 
unambiguously dictate a vertical integration strategy, if integration involves a higher fixed cost of 
organization. Therefore, firm productivity must surpass some threshold level for this strategy to be 
worthwhile. Notice that Θℓ  depends on the level of  , conditional on      ℓ. 
For intermediate elasticity  -values that satisfy          ℓ the comparison of  ℓ and  ℓ  is 
ambiguous. By monotonicity of     , for values in the upper range of this interval, we have 
 ℓ     ℓ , so that the logic of the preceding paragraph applies, meaning that firms below some 
threshold productivity choose outsourcing instead of vertical integration, and vice versa. Thus, the 
true threshold level of   that separates outsourcing firms from integrated ones is implicitly 
determined by  ℓ     ℓ . We denote this level by  ℓ , whereby       ℓ      ℓ.  
Summarizing what we have found so far, we may state that, whatever the input-supplier’s 
location, we should expect to see more productive firms organizing their sourcing through vertical 
integration, and less productive firms to choose outsourcing. But there are two important caveats. 
First the threshold productivity levels Θℓ   separating the two types of firms generally depend on 
the headquarter-elasticity  . Secondly, if this elasticity falls below a threshold value, then firm 
productivity simply doesn’t matter and all firms choose an outsourcing strategy. These caveats are 
important for estimation of “sourcing-premia” using the methodology of Bernard & Jensen (1999), 
as we do in the empirical part of this paper. Suppose, for instance, that we compare productivity 
levels across sourcing strategies of firms in different industries with differing 
headquarter-elasticities. Suppose, moreover, that we have an industry with a headquarter-elasticity 
below  ℓ  alongside others with elasticity values well above  ℓ . If the former industry has a large 
mass of firms with a high productivity, then we should not expect to observe a clear productivity 
ranking across sourcing modes, unless we control for differences in the headquarter-elasticity. In the 
subsequent empirical section of this paper, we control for this “headquarter-elasticity effect” 
                                                 
4 This may seem like a paradox. Why, after all, should a firm not be able to reduce its bargaining power? The underlying 





So far we have looked at organizational choice assuming that the input-supplier’s location is given. 
We now look at the choice of location explicitly. Remember our assumption relating to the fixed 
organizational cost:              
     
  . With this ranking, it is obvious that foreign sourcing 
will never be attractive, unless the foreign economy has an absolute cost advantage in the supplier 








    . We therefore assume 
that this inequality holds, which implies that           . We may then say that a firm’s 
productivity level Θ is a leverage for the cost-advantage of foreign sourcing. Moreover, we assume 
that the extent of the foreign cost advantage is specific to the industry, not the firm. With both 
dimensions explicitly in the picture, we have a more complex choice problem. Figure 1 depicts a 
case where all possible sourcing strategies will emerge in equilibrium, whereby the 
headquarter-elasticity is assumed to satisfy             . Hence, the profit-lines for vertical 
integration are steeper than those for outsourcing in either location. At the same time, by the 
assumption of a foreign cost advantage, they are steeper for offshoring than for domestic sourcing 
for either of the two organizational modes. However, these assumptions do not guarantee that all 
four sourcing strategies will appear in equilibrium. We must distinguish between two types of 
“degenerate” equilibria. 
First, we may have a case where the fixed cost-disadvantage of the integration strategy over the 
outsourcing strategy is small enough and/or the variable cost advantage large enough for integration 
to be the dominant strategy for all firms, irrespective of their productivity.
6 This may happen for the 
foreign or the domestic location, or indeed for both. However, even in this latter case, we would still 
observe foreign integration only for more productive firms. 
                                                 
5 There is a further caveat that we should like to add here. Suppose that we reverse the fixed cost assumption, such that 
 ℓ     ℓ , which does not seem all that implausible. Then we would observe firms with a headquarter-elasticity below 
 ℓ  potentially pursuing both strategies. If so, it would indeed be the less productive firms that do vertical integration. It 
becomes obvious that the predictions of the model heavily depend on the fixed cost ranking assumption. As we shall see 
in the empirical section, the case assumed in the text is supported by our data. 
6 All of this is, of course, conditional on positive expected profits, i.e., on remaining in the market in the first place. 14 
 
Second, the fixed cost of offshoring relative to domestic sourcing may be small enough, 
compared to the locational advantage in variable cost, so that the equilibrium features only 
offshoring firms. This may happen independently for either of the two organizational modes. But 





Both of these degenerate equilibria still entail a clear productivity ranking, provided that we 
allow for industry-specific fixed effects which now control for variations in the 
headquarter-elasticity and variations in the degree of foreign cost advantage. As an extreme case, by 
adding the two lines of reasoning behind these degenerate equilibria, we might even envisage a 
complete dominance of foreign integration. While not being in contradiction with the model, an 
Figure 1: Productivity ranking for an equilibrium with all sourcing modes 15 
 
industry of this type would simply not contribute any variation that could be used to empirically 
establish any “sourcing-premia”. 
Finally, we may allow for a modification in the fixed cost ranking, such that            
         . Notice that this still preserves the fundamental idea of an extra fixed cost deriving from 
executing property rights, as well as the idea of a fixed cost of offshoring within a given 
organizational mode. It might be tempting to argue, by looking at figure 1, that this just removes the 
domestic integration strategy. But this is not the case, since there is no fundamental reason within 
our model that forces us to assume, as we do in figure 1, that the profit line for domestic integration 
is flatter than the profit line for foreign outsourcing. We should thus not expect from the 
fundamental premises of the model to observe the productivity ranking depicted in figure 1. 
Observing domestic integration to be chosen by more productive firms than foreign outsourcing is 
perfectly consistent with the model. This is an important qualification for the empirical analysis of 
“sourcing-premia” below. 
This completes our theoretical view of the hold-up problem in a firm’s global sourcing decision, 
based on the seminal contribution of Antràs & Helpman (2004). The next section turns to an 
empirical analysis based on Spanish firm-level data. Our analysis will focus entirely on the 
productivity-sourcing-nexus, treating the “headquarter-elasticity effect” through 
industry-fixed-effects. The advantage of such a procedure is that it eschews the problem of finding a 
valid empirical measure of this elasticity. The literature often uses the capital-intensity or 
skill-intensity of production as a proxy.
7 But it clearly transpires from the above analysis that factor 
intensities may capture an entirely different channel, viz. the extent of the foreign cost advantage. 
We therefore chose to follow a procedure that avoids this problem altogether. 
3.  Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on the Spanish “Survey on Business Strategies” (ESEE)
8 from the 
Fundación SEPI
9. The Fundación SEPI surveys approximately 2,000 firms with ten or more 
employees from all over Spain on a yearly basis since 1990 and addresses strategic business issues, 
as well as revenue and balance sheet statistics. The sample covers approximately 70 percent of all 
                                                 
7 See Antràs (2003), Yeaple (2006), and Nunn & Trefler (2008). 
8“Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales”. 
9“Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales”. 16 
 
Spanish manufacturing firms with more than 200 employees, plus 5 percent of all firms with a 
number of employees between 10 and 200.
10 The coverage of firms is representative for each of the 
two firm size categories, and special care has been taken to control for the time dynamics in the 
panel which result from firms exiting and entering markets.
11 
There are three primary advantages associated with the use of this data compared to prior 
empirical research. First, we know for each firm whether it acquires intermediate inputs through 
each of the four sourcing strategies (foreign integration, foreign outsourcing, domestic integration, 
and domestic outsourcing). In the survey, intermediate inputs are defined as goods that have been 
acquired from a different legal entity (either related or unrelated to the firm) and “incorporated and 
transformed in the production process”. This perfectly fits into the Antràs & Helpman (2004) 
modeling setup.
12 Clearly, the simultaneous and coherent coverage of all four sourcing modes 
generates a much more comprehensive picture of global sourcing decisions than was the case with 
earlier studies.
13 Second, the data allow us to compute several common measures of firm 
productivity. We can thus evaluate the robustness of our findings in a convincing manner. This is an 
important point, since previous research has shown that empirical results are often sensitive to the 
specific way in which productivity is defined and/or estimated. Third, all firms in the sample are 
categorized by the degree of participation of other companies in a firm’s joint capital. We use this 
information to construct a subsample of firms that satisfy the crucial assumption that the 
input-supplier never has a controlling stake in the headquarter’s capital.
14 In other words, our firms 
do have complete discretion over the organizational mode of sourcing. 
Table 1 presents the absolute numbers and the percentages of firms with different sourcing 
strategies in the year 2007. We distinguish between foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing 
(  ), domestic integration (  ), and domestic outsourcing (  ), as well as all possible 
combinations thereof. This distinction implies that sourcing categories are mutually exclusive in the 
                                                 
10 Small-sized firms have been selected by a stratified sampling procedure. 
11For a comprehensive data description see http://www.funep.es/esee/en/einfo_que_es.asp. 
12We again emphasize that the modeling framework does not envisage a situation in which there is a command 
hierarchy in the strict sense of the word between firm and input producer. 
13In principle, our data set covers the years 2000-2007 but we can distinguish the four strategic options for intermediate 
input sourcing only for the two most recent years. Nonetheless, we take the whole panel into account where its use 
provides us with additional insights or more accurate estimates (for example, we rely on the whole panel data set when 
it comes to total factor productivity estimation). 
14 Note also that all data refer to a specific legal entity and not to a corporate group comprising a number of 
economically interdependent entities. 17 
 
sense that each firm is assigned to exactly one specific (though potentially mixed) sourcing strategy. 
Close to 50 percent of the firms in our sample engage in two or more sourcing modes 
simultaneously. Looking at large firms only, we find an even more telling picture: almost 80 percent 
of all firms with more than 200 employees make use of such complex sourcing strategies. Strictly 
speaking, a combinatory use of sourcing channels is ruled out in Antràs (2003) and Antràs & 
Helpman (2004), where each firm is assumed to buy a single specific manufacturing component, for 
which there is a unique optimal sourcing strategy. In our sample, however, only 2.7 percent of firms 
pursue pure sourcing strategies other than domestic outsourcing. To give an example, the 
overwhelming majority (more than 98 percent) of all foreign-integration-firms take advantage of at 
least one additional type of sourcing channel. Therefore, and with an eye on the subsequent 
econometric analysis, the notion of complex strategies is highly relevant. We also find that nearly 
half of the firms are active in foreign sourcing in the sense that they do engage in either vertical FDI 
or offshore outsourcing, or both. By way of comparison, the equivalent percentage number for 
Japan’s manufacturing firms is five percent; see Tomiura (2007). The high share of international 
firms in Spain seems to reflect the high degree of economic integration in Europe.
15 Indeed, more 
than 70 percent of the total value of imported goods have a member country of the European Union 




                                                                                      
97  8  14  3  45  144  12  68  8  73  2  0  5  4  50 
17.7  1.5  2.6  0.5  8.2  26.3  2.2  12.4  1.5  13.3  0.4  0.0  0.9  0.7  9.1 
Small firms (< 201 employees) 
                                                                                      
809  9  19  1  50  389  9  46  2  23  0  0  0  1  11 
56.3  0.6  1.3  0.1  3.7  28.4  0.7  3.4  0.1  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8 
Sample firms 
                                                                                      
906  17  33  4  95  533  21  114  10  96  2  0  5  5  61 
45.7  0.9  1.7  0.2  4.8  26.9  1.1  5.7  0.5  4.8  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.3  3.1 
Note: In each subtable the middle row and the last row give the numbers and the percentages of firms in the various sourcing categories, 
respectively. All percentages are of the total number of firms in the respective size category in the 2007 sample (N=548 for large firms, N= 1,436 
for small firms, and N=1,984 for the whole 2007 sample).We represent foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 
(  ), and domestic outsourcing (  ), as well as all combinations thereof. 
 
                                                 
15 Admittedly, the number is somewhat overstated since large firms are overrepresented in the sample. Still, the 
difference is impressive even when looking at small firms only. 
16These numbers correspond to imports in 2006. 18 
 
In table 2 we assign firms to groups   ,   ,   , and    in a mutually inclusive way such that 
a single firm may appear in more than one category. Integration as opposed to outsourcing of 
intermediate input suppliers is reserved for only a minority of firms. 304 firms (15 percent) procure 
intermediate inputs from related parties in Spain, 202 firms (10 percent) acquire them from related 
parties abroad. By contrast, nearly all firms outsource part of their production to independent 
suppliers in the domestic economy, and more than 40 percent do so in the foreign economy. Another 
important observation is that in 2007 (2006) there is a small fraction of around four (six) percent of 
firms that do not report purchasing any intermediate inputs at all. These firms appear to manufacture 
and combine all inputs necessary for final goods production within their own legal entity’s 
command structure. In terms of our model, such firms are able to avoid any “hold-up” problem of 
the type considered above, and to achieve efficient investment levels in all inputs. On the other 
hand, they also forego the option to arbitrage on factor price differences across countries. We shall 
address this issue further, when discussing our empirical results in the next section. 
Table 2: Firms in Mutually Inclusive Sourcing Categories in 2007 
Large firms (> 200 employees)  Small firms (< 201 employees)  Sample firms 
   Number  in %   Number  in %     Number  in % 
Domestic Outsourcing  497  90.7  1,339  93.2  1,836  92.5 
Domestic Integration  186  33.9  118  8.2  304  15.3 
Foreign Outsourcing  360  65.7  489  34.1  849  42.8 
Foreign Integration  155  28.3   47  3.3     202  10.2 





The disaggregation into large and small firms in table 2 reveals at least two interesting 
regularities. On the one hand, sourcing inputs from a vertically integrated supplier is a much more 
common strategy for large firms than for small firms. In fact, one third of firms with more than 200 
employees are domestic-integration-firms, and close to 30 percent are foreign-integration-firms. 
The corresponding numbers for small firms are eight and three percent, respectively. On the other 
hand, large firms are on average much more present in international sourcing markets than small 
firms which is very much in line with earlier evidence on export markets. Both observations taken 
together provide us with a clear hint as regards the fixed cost ranking of global sourcing strategies. 
Since high fixed costs constitute an especially high hurdle for smaller firms, the Spanish data point 
towards a ranking that satisfies           and           as well as          , as assumed in 
Antràs & Helpman (2004). 19 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
As we have detailed in the theoretical section, the Antràs & Helpman (2004) model suggests that 
firms who face a hold-up problem in sourcing select themselves into different sourcing strategies, 
depending on their productivity level and certain structural characteristics of the underlying 
production relationship. In this section, we want to examine whether our data lend empirical support 
to the hypothesized productivity ranking. We proceed in two steps. First, we apply a non-parametric 
test based on the principle of first order stochastic dominance, in order to compare cumulative 
productivity distributions for certain groups of firms that differ in their sourcing behavior. To be 
more precise, we test for dominance among the two groups of firms that choose different 
organizational forms, viz. outsourcing and vertical integration. We do so separately for the domestic 
sourcing and for offshoring. We also test for stochastic dominance among the two groups that differ 
in sourcing domestically or offshore, whatever the organizational form. In the second step, we adopt 
the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology, which has seen extensive use in estimation productivity- 
and size-premia of exporting relative to non-exporting firms. We modify this approach so that it 
allows us to estimate productivity-premia for firms engaging in different sourcing modes (relative to 
a baseline category) in a unified econometric framework. 
Throughout our analysis, we use four different measures of firm productivity  , in order to 
evaluate the sensitivity of our results with respect to different specifications of productivity. The 
specifications chosen are labor productivity (     ) computed as valued added per hour worked 
and three different measures of total factor productivity computed from estimations of sectoral 
production functions. The first uses standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, the second 
uses a fixed-effects model, and the third employs the Olley & Pakes (1996) framework. We denote 
these measures as        ,       , and       , respectively.
17 We treat        as the 
preferred measure since the Olley & Pakes (1996) method controls for endogeneity problems that 
may arise from unobserved productivity shocks and/or firms’ market exit decisions. Our results are 
assuringly robust to the use of different productivity measures. We report results only for 
      .
18 
The entire empirical analysis is conducted relying on two types of samples. The first is restricted 
                                                 
17 See appendix for details. 
18 All other results are available from the authors upon request. 20 
 
to true headquarter firms, meaning that we exclude a firm if some other company owns more than 50 
percent of the firm’s capital and/or if the firm is subject to foreign ownership.
19 As we have already 
pointed out in section two, restricting the sample along this dimension is important, in order to 
ensure that we only observe firms with full discretion over their sourcing strategies. The second is 
the unrestricted sample, which has the advantage of a larger number of observations, but risks 
including firms whose sourcing strategy is dictated by their parental company. If we obtain differing 
results, this is an indication that controlling for true headquarter-status, which to the best of our 




In this subsection we employ a non-parametric approach to evaluate the productivity ranking 
hypothesized in section two. For this purpose we plot empirical cumulative distribution functions 
for estimates of total factor productivity for firms belonging to different sourcing groups. Suppose 
we compare two cumulative distribution functions      and     , each of which represents the 
productivity distribution of one sourcing mode. We say that      stochastically dominates      
at first order, if              0         and         with               0. Computing the 
distribution free Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic (K-S test), we can then conclude a) whether or 
not the two groups share the same underlying productivity distribution (two-sided test) and b) 
whether or not the distribution of one group dominates the other (one-sided test). Formally, we test 
the following hypotheses: 
(i)  The two-sided test we are interested in is whether  
  :             0         against   :        with               0 
can be rejected. 
(ii)  The one-sided test is to see if it is true that 
  :             0         against   :        with             0  
cannot be rejected. 
                                                 
19 The threshold value of control is not decisive. For example, in 2007 we exclude roughly 30 percent of the total 
number of firms (N=1,984). Reducing the threshold value to 25 percent would eliminate only a slightly larger number of 
firms but leave any of our results unchanged. 
20 It should be noted that restricting the sample along the ownership dimension significantly decreases the share of large 
firms in the sample. 21 
 
The K-S test uses the maximum vertical distance between the curves of two cumulated distribution 
functions as the statistic  , which makes it a particularly robust and useful test whenever the true 
distributions are unknown. 
 
 
In figure 2 we display the cumulative distribution functions for 2006 and 2007 separately since 
the K-S testing procedure assumes independence across observations.
21 Each panel depicts two 
functions, each representing a distinct sourcing strategy, as indicated in the legend. For a firm to be 
assigned to a specific sourcing category, we require that it obtains some intermediate inputs through 
the respective sourcing mode.
22 Any firm that uses both of the two strategies considered is assigned 
to the group for which our maintained hypothesis implies a higher fixed cost; see section two above. 
                                                 
21 We only show distribution functions from the unrestricted sample since there are no qualitative differences when 
using the restricted sample instead. Also, results from the K-S testing procedure are qualitatively identical. 
22 Thus, we completely disregard non-sourcing firms in this subsection. 
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The samples do not exclude firms that are additionally active in any other sourcing mode.
23 The 
graphs suggest a first order stochastic dominance the productivity distribution for integration over 
that of outsourcing and for offshoring over domestic sourcing of inputs. This is as expected from 
theory. 
The formal test for stochastic dominance using the K-S procedure confirms what the figures 
suggest. The null hypothesis of the two-sided test under which the samples are drawn from the same 
distribution has to be rejected in all cases; see table 3. Furthermore, we can never reject the null 
hypothesis of the one-sided test where we evaluate whether or not integration dominates 
outsourcing and whether or not offshoring dominates domestic sourcing. By way of contrast, we 










      
              
    0.2161  0.000  0.2629  0.000 
      
              
    ‐0.0094  0.957 ‐ 0.0053  0.986 
Two‐Sided Test  0.2161  0.000     0.2629  0.000 
      
              
     0.2196  0.000  0.2252  0.000 
      
              
     ‐0.0011  1.000 ‐ 0.0110  0.963 
Two‐Sided Test  0.2196  0.000     0.2252  0.000 
      
             
    0.1795  0.000  0.1708  0.000 
      
             
    ‐0.0009  0.999 ‐ 0.0039  0.985 





What do we learn from this first stage of our empirical analysis? We draw two main 
conclusions. First, there are significant productivity differentials between firms that choose a 
strategy of vertical integration and those that go for outsourcing. The productivity distribution for 
                                                 
23 This is no decisive condition. We redo the whole exercise excluding all firms that are additionally sourcing through 
other modes but the results remain basically unchanged. 
24 Since the sampling properties of our data vary depending on whether firms have more than 200 employees or not, we 
are worried about the possibility that the results might not generalize to the Spanish manufacturing industry as a whole. 
Therefore, we repeat the entire procedure for the two size categories separately. We find that our results are strongly 
confirmed for small-size firms, while there are some ambiguities as regards very large firms. The true productivity 
distribution of Spanish manufacturing firms could then be obtained by weighting the two distributions according to their 
appearance in the Spanish universe of manufacturing firms. Since the small-size firms are underrepresented in our 
sample, we argue that our findings may be generalized without any further concerns. 23 
 
the first group of firms features clear stochastic dominance over the second. Notably, this statement 
holds true for both, the domestic and the foreign sourcing markets, as suggested by theory. Second, 
as regards the locational choice of intermediate input production, we find clear-cut evidence in favor 
of the idea that offshoring requires a higher productivity than domestic sourcing. Again, this result is 
in line with our theoretical model. 
4.2  Estimating sourcing premia 
In this subsection we estimate productivity premia for firms in different sourcing groups using a 
regression framework borrowed from Bernard & Jensen (1999). We regress a firm’s productivity 
level on binary variables that indicate a firm’s specific sourcing strategy. In the theoretical model of 
section two, firms face a quaternary choice of intermediate input production where the unique 
profit-maximizing strategy is either foreign integration (  ),  or foreign outsourcing (  ),  or 
domestic integration (  ), or domestic outsourcing (  ). In the subsequent regression analysis, we 
capture this idea by computing “sourcing dummies” in a hierarchical and mutually exclusive way. If 
a firm is active in two or more sourcing modes, we assign it to the category which, according to our 
maintained hypothesis, is associated with the highest fixed cost. In an alternative specification, we 
depart from this approach and construct the sourcing indicators in a mutually inclusive way. For 
example, the dummies for    and    both take on a value of one, and the dummies for    and 
   a value of zero, if a firm engages in both vertical FDI and offshore outsourcing, but not in 
domestic sourcing. We thus allow for more flexibility in the estimation procedure, in order to detect 
differences to the former, more restrictive coding structure that satisfies mutual exclusion. 
Formally, we estimate the following panel model: 
              λ     ,           1,…, ,         1,…, ,                      (7) 
where                   . 
In this expression,     is the dependent variable for firm   at time  ,        1 ,     ,…,       is a 
vector of explanatory variables,      ,   ,…,        is a vector of parameters to estimate 
(including an intercept), and     is a composite error term including an unobserved firm-effect    
and an idiosyncratic error    . 
We implement three estimation methods. The first simply pools the data and applies ordinary 
least squares (OLS). This estimator yields consistent estimates, as long as there is no systematic 24 
 
contemporaneous correlation between the composite error term and the explanatory variables. To 
take into account serial correlation within panel units arising from the unobserved firm-level effect 
  , we always report robust standard errors clustered by firm. Second, we average all variables 
across the two time periods and apply OLS, whereby we again disregard the time-variation in the 
data.
25 This estimator is called the “between-estimator” in the literature. The model reads as  
                             ,       1 ,…,  ,                       (8) 
       where                           , 
Bars indicate mean values over time. For this model to deliver consistent estimates, the variables in 
    need to be strictly exogenous, conditional on   , and     has to be independent from   . The 
third estimation method explicitly treats the data as a panel and controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms by estimating a random-effects model. Under the same assumptions as 
before, this is an efficient estimator. 
Our theoretical analysis in section two highlights the interplay between firm-specific 
productivity   and industry-specific headquarter-elasticity   in shaping firms’ global sourcing 
decisions. Obviously, this interaction implies that the productivity premia may differ across 
industries, provided that industries feature different   -values. Since our purpose here is not to 
provide a sector-by-sector assessment of performance premia, we control for sector-specific 
“headquarter-elasticity effects” by including industry-dummies in all of our regressions.
26 From 
previous research we must expect that there is a productivity premium also on exporting; see 
Bernard et al. (2007). To control for this, we additionally incorporate a firm’s export status 
(      ) in our set of regressors. Otherwise, we would be liable to observe spurious positive 
correlation between foreign sourcing modes and productivity. This could happen, for instance, if 
firms obtain access to new information through exporting, and if that information reduces the fixed 
cost of offshoring. Furthermore, we follow the empirical literature on productivity premia in 
including a firm’s age (   ) and size in terms of employees (    ) as control variables. From 
established theory, we expect a positive sign on the size coefficient. Where feasible, we always 
include a year dummy in our regressions, in order to isolate our estimates from any year-specific 
effects. 
                                                 
25Note again that we observe the sourcing strategies for the years 2006 and 2007 only. 
26 As we have shown in section two, the productivity ranking also depends on a certain fixed cost ranking, which further 
reinforces the use of industry-specific fixed effects. 25 
 
As we have mentioned before, our sample includes observations where firms report not to 
source any inputs outside their own hierarchical control. For both of our coding rules, these firms 
should be assigned zero values for all indicator variables for sourcing. Strictly speaking, the global 
sourcing model of section two is silent on why such firms should exist. It assumes at the outset that 
generating revenue requires two different agents to be involved in the production relationship. We 
tackle this problem in two ways. First, we exclude all “non-sourcing firms” from the sample and 
estimate all productivity premia relative to the baseline category of domestic outsourcing. Our 
model suggests a productivity-dependent sorting pattern such that only the most productive firms 
source through vertical integration of a foreign input-supplier, and only the least productive firms 
outsource intermediate input production in the domestic economy. Moreover, firms that outsource 
the input to a foreign supplier are expected to feature a higher productivity level than firms pursuing 
vertical integration of a domestic supplier. Under the fixed cost ordering hypothesized in section 
two, we thus expect the following coefficient ranking for our three indicator variables:          
  . The second strategy is to include indicator variables for all four sourcing modes in the 
regression and treat the “non-sourcing firm” as the baseline category, where we have no ex-ante 
view on the productivity level of non-sourcing firms relative to the other modes. In this case, the 
coefficient ranking is expected to satisfy                  . 
Tables 4 and 5 present the first set of results for total factor productivity premia, based on the 
restricted sample of true headquarter firms. We summarize the most relevant results as follows. 
First, we find the hypothesized ranking of coefficients in the overwhelming majority of cases. 
Notice that the ranking is preserved when firm size is controlled for. Among the indicator variables, 
foreign integration consistently exhibits the largest of all coefficients, and it is always significantly 
different from zero. The results indicate that firms sourcing through vertical integration of a foreign 
supplier are roughly 50 percent more productive than firms who source through an independent 
domestic supplier, assuming that firm size does not play a role.
27 Second, firms engaged in 
domestic outsourcing are consistently revealed as the least productive of all. In table 4, all 
coefficients of all other sourcing-dummies are positive and mostly significant, while in table 5 the 
dummy for domestic outsourcing is the only sourcing indicator with a negative coefficient. 
Translating our regression coefficients into magnitudes of premia, we recognize that firms engaged 
in foreign outsourcing are somewhat above 20 percent more productive than those who do so in the 
                                                 
27 The premia are calculated from the coefficients as follows:        ℓ    100    exp  ℓ   1    26 
 
home economy. For domestic integration the premium is somewhat below 20 percent.
28 Third, we 
do not find a statistically significant difference between firms who choose a strategy of foreign 
outsourcing and those who source through domestic vertical integration, although the point 
estimates of the coefficients for    and    do suggest that the former are more productive than 
the latter. Generally speaking, our regressions elucidate important structural differences in the 
productivity levels of firms depending on their sourcing channels, and these differences are 
impressively consistent with the model of global sourcing introduced by Antràs & Helpman (2004). 
Table 4: Total Factor Productivity Premia (Mutually Exclusive Sourcing Dummies, Non‐Sourcing Firms Excluded) 
Pooled OLS   Between Estimator  Random Effects 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.447*** 0.403***  0.236**  0.532***  0.484***  0.295**  0.371***  0.324*** 0.192** 
(0.107)  (0.109)  (0.105)  (0.131)  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.089)  (0.091)  (0.085) 
    0.192*** 0.163***  0.118*** 0.224***  0.192***  0.142***  0.145***  0.117*** 0.081***
(0.027)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
    0.177**  0.171**  0.076  0.177**  0.170**  0.059  0.118*  0.110*  0.040 
(0.073)  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.082)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.067) 
     ‐0.000 ‐ 0.002** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.088***  0.030  0.0812**  0.019  0.101*** 0.048 
(0.029)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
      0.085*** 0.086***  0.085***
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Constant  8.318*** 8.286***  8.009*** 8.280***  8.248***  7.973***  8.320***  8.274*** 7.994***
   (0.069)  (0.071)  (0.080)     (0.080)  (0.082)  (0.092)     (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.080) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.02  0.03  0.26     0.02  0.03  0.25     0.01  0.02  0.19 
 0:          0.04  0.07  0.20  0.02  0.04  0.12  0.02  0.05  0.14 
 0:          0.84  0.92  0.58     0.57  0.79  0.32     0.67  0.92  0.53 
Observations  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474 
    0.14  0.14  0.17     0.16  0.17  0.19     0.16  0.16  0.19 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where 
the dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 






How do things change if we code our indicator variables for the sourcing strategies in a 
mutually inclusive way? Tables 6 and 7 reveal that the picture changes dramatically. First, the 
results no longer suggest a robust ranking of sourcing coefficients. Although we can still be 
confident that firms engaged in domestic outsourcing firms belong to the least productive firms in  
                                                 




VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)   (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.428*** 0.380***  0.205*  0.509***  0.461***  0.266*  0.346***  0.299*** 0.162* 
  (0.112)  (0.113)  (0.109)  (0.141)  (0.142)  (0.143)  (0.093)  (0.093)  (0.088) 
    0.169*** 0.140***  0.088**  0.198***  0.171**  0.112*  0.117***  0.092**  0.053 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.066)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.038) 
    0.153*  0.150*  0.048  0.149  0.149  0.030  0.089  0.086  0.012 
  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.099)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.071) 
    ‐0.022 ‐ 0.017 ‐ 0.024 ‐ 0.027 ‐ 0.018 ‐ 0.026 ‐ 0.024 ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.023 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
     ‐0.000 ‐ 0.002** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001  0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.100***  0.041  0.091***  0.029  0.108*** 0.054* 
  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
      0.086*** 0.086***  0.087***
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Constant  8.347*** 8.303***  8.030*** 8.324***  8.275***  8.007***  8.357***  8.298*** 8.016***
   (0.077)  (0.079)  (0.085)     (0.0968)  (0.0989)  (0.106)   (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.083) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No   Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.02  0.02  0.25     0.02  0.03  0.02   0.01  0.02  0.18 
 0:          0.03  0.07  0.20  0.02  0.04  0.11  0.02  0.05  0.14 
 0:          0.83  0.89  0.60  0.55  0.80  0.32  0.66  0.92  0.53 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.03 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 0:          0.02  0.02  0.35     0.03  0.04  0.49   0.08  0.10  0.60 
Observations  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632 
    0.14  0.14  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.19  0.16  0.16  0.19 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where 
the dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 







the sample (together with “non-sourcing firms”), we do not find a significant difference between 
any two of the remaining sourcing coefficients. How does this fit with our earlier results obtained 
with mutually exclusive sourcing dummies? Strictly speaking, our regressions suggest that any 
sourcing category contributes equally to a firm’s productivity premium, relative to the pure 
domestic outsourcing (or “non-sourcing”) case. For each additional sourcing mode, the productivity 
premium rises by roughly 20 percentage points when size is not controlled for. Thus, the 
interpretation seems straightforward: foreign integration per se does not imply that a firm is among 
the most productive ones. Rather, high productivity premia seem related to the fact that firms 
simultaneously combine various sourcing channels. This is remarkable in that it points to the need 




VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.194*  0.182  0.096  0.258*  0.242*  0.144  0.197**  0.179*  0.102 
  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.108)  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.133)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.087) 
    0.173***  0.146***  0.111***  0.204*** 0.174*** 0.133*** 0.131***  0.104*** 0.076***
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.028) 
    0.196***  0.193***  0.097  0.174*** 0.170*** 0.064  0.164***  0.159*** 0.078 
  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.060)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.056) 
     ‐0.001 ‐ 0.002** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.087***  0.033  0.083*** 0.022  0.101*** 0.050* 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.030) 
      0.081***  0.084*** 0.082***
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Constant  8.298***  8.269***  8.013***  8.265*** 8.235*** 7.974*** 8.301***  8.259*** 7.997***
   (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.080)   (0.080)  (0.082)  (0.092)     (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.080) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes   No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.86  0.77  0.89  0.71  0.63  0.94  0.52  0.46  0.79 
 0:          0.99  0.93  0.99  0.59  0.64  0.60  0.78  0.86  0.82 
 0:          0.71  0.45  0.83   0.65  0.96  0.31     0.57  0.36  0.98 
Observations  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474  2474 
    0.14  0.15  0.17   0.17  0.17  0.19     0.16  0.17  0.19 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where 
the dependent variable      OP  is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 





It is worth noting that the inclusion of firm size affects the coefficients for outsourcing and 
integration dummies differently. While it takes up all productivity differences of the two integration 
modes with respect to the baseline categories, the coefficient for    continues to be highly 
significant. Apparently, firm size plays a superior role in explaining productivity premia of 
vertically integrating firms. 
In the text, we only report the results for the restricted sample, but we find at least two 
interesting differences between the estimates with the unrestricted and the restricted samples.
29 
First, the coefficient ranking obtained with mutually exclusive coding of the indicator variables 
changes slightly once we include “non-headquarter” firms in the sample. Indeed, what we observe is 
a reversal in the ranking of the coefficients for foreign outsourcing and domestic integration, and 
this reversal is at least marginally significant in several specifications. This finding is consistent 
with empirical evidence reported by Federico (2009), who cannot identify true headquarters in his 
                                                 
29 See the appendix for estimation results with the unrestricted sample. 29 
 
sample of Italian manufacturing firms.
30 Second, all point estimates of the sourcing coefficients are 
smaller with the unrestricted sample than with the restricted sample, with one exception: The 
  -dummy features a larger coefficient with the unrestricted sample when “non-sourcing firms” are 
excluded. Generally, this observation suggests that true headquarter firms have to overcome higher 
productivity hurdles relative to the domestic outsourcing category than “non-headquarter” firms 
whose sourcing strategy might not always reflect their own decision, but that of a domestic or 
foreign parental company. 
Table 7: Total Factor Productivity Premia (Mutually Inclusive Sourcing Dummies, Non‐Sourcing Firms Included) 
Pooled OLS  Between Estimator  Random Effects 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.198*  0.182  0.095  0.262**  0.242*  0.145  0.200**  0.180*  0.101 
  (0.115)  (0.114)  (0.106)  (0.132)  (0.132)  (0.131)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.085) 
    0.170*** 0.137***  0.103*** 0.204*** 0.168*** 0.128*** 0.124***  0.096*** 0.069** 
  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.027) 
    0.193*** 0.190***  0.091  0.170*** 0.165*** 0.059  0.161***  0.155*** 0.073 
  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.059)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.055) 
    0.011  0.017  0.009 ‐ 0.013 ‐ 0.003 ‐ 0.011  0.006  0.010  0.004 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
     ‐0.000 ‐ 0.002** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.100***  0.044  0.093*** 0.032  0.109*** 0.057** 
  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.029) 
      0.083*** 0.084*** 0.083***
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Constant  8.299*** 8.256***  8.004*** 8.297*** 8.249*** 7.994*** 8.312***  8.257*** 7.996***
   (0.075)  (0.077)  (0.083)     (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.101)    (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.082) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.81  0.71  0.95  0.68  0.60  0.90  0.46  0.41  0.73 
 0:          0.97  0.95  0.98  0.55  0.62  0.57  0.73  0.82  0.79 
 0:          0.70  0.41  0.86  0.61  0.97  0.31  0.54  0.33  0.96 
 0:          0.12  0.17  0.44  0.06  0.09  0.28  0.05  0.09  0.28 
 0:          0.00  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.06  0.14 
 0:          0.01  0.01  0.23     0.02  0.03  0.37     0.01  0.01  0.26 
Observations  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632  2632 
    0.14  0.15  0.17  0.16  0.17  0.19  0.16  0.17  0.19 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where 
the dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 




                                                 
30 It should be noted, however, that this sort of ambiguity in the data can by no means be interpreted as evidence against 
the model. In fact, a potential reversal in the productivity ranking of    and    firms can easily be rationalized within 




Recent theoretical developments have helped us understand why firm heterogeneity in productivity 
might even be a long-run equilibrium phenomenon. Such theoretical models imply that firms with 
different productivity levels behave differently, even when they face the same market environment. 
This seems corroborated by a wealth of empirical literature which shows that more productive firms 
are more likely to actively pursue strategies of internationalization both in generating revenue and 
sourcing inputs. We now have an impressive body of theory that explains such “globalization 
premia” through a self-selection of firms into different strategies of internationalization, based on 
exogenous differences in their productivity. 
In this paper, we have presented empirical evidence on such premia, based on a very prominent 
model of this type developed by Antràs & Helpman (2004). In this model, firm heterogeneity is 
determined as in Melitz (2003), and firms face the problem of sourcing their inputs in an 
environment that is characterized by a hold-up problem due to lack of enforceable contracts. They 
react to this environment by choosing between two organizational forms of sourcing, 
viz. outsourcing via arms-length transactions and acquiring property rights in the desired inputs, 
respectively. In addition, firms face the more familiar choice between domestic and foreign 
sourcing. Thus, there are four possible strategies, and the model suggests that firms with different 
productivity levels adopt different strategies. In this paper, we have first examined the interplay 
between a firm’s productivity and other characteristics of production that should determine its 
sourcing strategy. We have then examined the empirical relevance of the “global sourcing premia” 
implied by the model, relying on Spanish firm-level data that are uniquely geared towards such an 
empirical exercise. In doing so, we have used both, non-parametric methods as well as an estimation 
approach. 
We find a productivity ranking across different sourcing strategies which is impressively 
consistent with the model. Firms who choose vertical integration tend to be more productive than 
those who rely on arms-length transactions, and firms who source offshore are generally more 
productive than those who source their inputs domestically. This is in line with the theoretical 
model, provided that foreign sourcing unambiguously requires larger fixed costs than domestic 
sources, and that exercising property rights always entails a larger fixed cost than arms-length 
transactions, as hypothesized by Antràs & Helpman (2004). We do not offer any independent 31 
 
empirical support for this ranking, but the ranking seems very plausible. 
We see the following agenda for future research on this issue. First, as regards theoretical 
modeling, we feel that the model should be generalized so as to generate outcomes where a firm 
adopts foreign and domestic sourcing strategies as well as different organizational modes at the 
same time, because this is what we find in the data. A step in this direction has been achieved in 
Antràs & Helpman (2008) where the assumption of complete lack of enforceable contracts has been 
relaxed. In our view, a more general and flexible modeling framework relating to the notion of 
offshoring and/or vertical integration would constitute further progress.  
As regards empirical analysis, a more comprehensive examination of how a firm’s sourcing 
strategy relates to further characteristics of the underlying production relationship would seem 
important. In particular, the notion of a “headquarter-elasticity” which is a key variable in the model 
should also be brought into the realm of empirical observations. Our analysis suggests that doing so 
through empirical measures of capital intensity or skill intensity as a proxy risks confounding 
strategic issues pertaining to the hold-up problem with cost advantages from offshoring. These two 
aspects need to be clearly separated, both in the theoretical framework and the empirical analysis. 32 
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Appendix 
This appendix gives information on how we compute the different measures of productivity at the 
level of the firm. Where necessary, we calculate real values in terms of 2007 prices using sectoral 
price indexes provided by the national statistics institute (INE) in Spain.  
Labor productivity.      . Computed as value added divided by the approximation of hours 
effectively worked. The units of the hourly productivity may be interpreted as Euros per hour. This 
variable is calculated only for companies with non-negative values added. Value added is defined as 
the sum of sales, changes in the stock of inventory, and other operating income minus the sum of 
purchases and the costs of external services.  
Total factor productivity.        . Computed as the residual of sectoral production function 
estimates according to the following regression equation (estimated by standard OLS).  
                               ,     ( A 1 )  
where    is log-value added in year     2000,…,2007,    is the log value of the capital stock net 
of amortization and depreciation,    is the log value of the average number of employees per year, 
   is the age of the firm (in years), and    is the error term. The capital stock excludes all 
immaterial and financial assets. The average number of employees over the year is the sum of 
full-time regular employees, 1/2 of part-time regular employees (both items as of December 31st), 
and the average number of eventual workers.  
Total factor productivity.       . Computed as the residual of sectoral estimates of equation 
(A1) with a fixed-effects model in order to account for unobserved time-invariant firm 
heterogeneity. The basic idea is as follows. If     Ω    , where    is an error term with usual 
properties and Ω is a time-invariant productivity differential that is being observed by the firm (but 
not the econometrician), then there may be systematic correlation between    and    and    
because the firm will incorporate this additional information in the decision of how many inputs to 
use (simultaneity bias). Thus, the OLS estimates are biased. With the fixed-effects specification we 
eliminate Ω and get consistent estimates.  
Total factor productivity.       . Computed as the residual of estimates of equation (A1) with 
the Olley & Pakes (1996) methodology. Suppose Ω changes over time such that     Ω       . 
Then, the fixed-effects model yields biased estimates. We account for this endogeneity issue by 35 
 
applying a consistent three-step estimation procedure proposed by Olley & Pakes (1996) where 
capital investment    is meant to proxy for the unobserved productivity shock Ω . In doing so, we 
automatically address the selection bias problem that results from inefficient firms exiting the 
market and constitutes another potential source of inconsistency. For details regarding the 





VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)   (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.331***  0.287***  0.142*** 0.363*** 0.319*** 0.160*** 0.278***  0.236*** 0.118***
  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.046)  (0.045)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.037)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
    0.179***  0.147***  0.095*** 0.205*** 0.172*** 0.115*** 0.138***  0.110*** 0.070***
  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
    0.234***  0.219***  0.123*** 0.253*** 0.239*** 0.133**  0.185***  0.172*** 0.094** 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
     ‐0.000 ‐ 0.001** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.096***  0.020  0.090*** 0.011  0.108*** 0.035 
  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
      0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090***
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  8.352***  8.309***  8.019*** 8.332*** 8.293*** 8.005*** 8.372***  8.317*** 8.021***
   (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.075)   (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.075)   (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.077) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes   No  No  No   Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.28   0.00  0.00  0.34   0.00  0.00  0.22 
 0:          0.08  0.22  0.72  0.09  0.22  0.67  0.05  0.19  0.62 
 0:          0.22  0.12  0.54   0.37  0.22  0.75   0.24  0.13  0.54 
Observations  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717 
    0.15  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.21  0.17  0.18  0.21 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where 
the dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration 













VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.292***  0.246***  0.104*  0.307***  0.264***  0.111  0.243***  0.204***  0.089* 
  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
    0.140***  0.109***  0.058  0.149**  0.119**  0.067  0.103***  0.078**  0.039 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.059)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033) 
    0.195***  0.183***  0.088  0.198***  0.189**  0.086  0.147***  0.138***  0.0634 
  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.075)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
    ‐0.037 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.032 ‐ 0.055 ‐ 0.047 ‐ 0.042 ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.026 ‐ 0.026 
  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
     ‐0.000 ‐ 0.001** ‐ 0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.110***  0.032  0.103***  0.023  0.117***  0.044* 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
      0.090***  0.091***  0.090*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  8.393***  8.336***  8.047***  8.396***  8.339***  8.046***  8.411***  8.343***  8.045*** 
   (0.072)  (0.074)  (0.080)     (0.085)  (0.087)  (0.091)     (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.079) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.29     0.00  0.00  0.33     0.00  0.00  0.21 
 0:          0.08  0.26  0.77  0.09  0.25  0.69  0.04  0.18  0.59 
 0:          0.22  0.11  0.51  0.37  0.20  0.72  0.26  0.13  0.54 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.01     0.00  0.00  0.02     0.00  0.00  0.02 
Observations  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915 
    0.15  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.18  0.21  0.17  0.18  0.21 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the 
dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration (  ), domestic 
























VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.159***  0.139***  0.053  0.169***  0.149***  0.054  0.142***  0.123***  0.052 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039) 
    0.114***  0.083***  0.048**  0.139***  0.106***  0.068**  0.085***  0.058***  0.033 
  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
    0.148***  0.140***  0.058  0.155***  0.147***  0.061*  0.125***  0.117***  0.048 
  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
     0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.108***  0.029  0.102***  0.020  0.117***  0.042 
  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
      0.092***  0.093***  0.091*** 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Constant  8.362***  8.310***  8.019***  8.343***  8.294***  8.004***  8.378***  8.316***  8.021*** 
   (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.074)     (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.075)     (0.065)  (0.068)  (0.077) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.40  0.29  0.93     0.59  0.44  0.79     0.24  0.18  0.69 
 0:          0.85  0.99  0.94  0.82  0.97  0.90  0.73  0.91  0.92 
 0:          0.40  0.17  0.83     0.73  0.37  0.88     0.28  0.12  0.70 
Observations  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717  3717 
    0.14  0.15  0.17     0.17  0.17  0.20     0.17  0.17  0.21 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the 
dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration (  ), and a firm's 


























Pooled OLS     Between Estimator  Random Effects 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5)  (6)     (7)  (8)  (9) 
    0.158***  0.136***  0.052  0.167***  0.145***  0.053  0.143***  0.123***  0.054 
  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038) 
    0.111***  0.077***  0.042*  0.135***  0.098***  0.060**  0.081***  0.054**  0.028 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
    0.146***  0.137***  0.056  0.152***  0.143***  0.058  0.121***  0.113***  0.045 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.032) 
    ‐0.002  0.002  0.012 ‐ 0.019 ‐ 0.013  0.003 ‐ 0.004 ‐ 0.001  0.005 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
     0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001**  0.000 ‐ 0.001* 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
        0.121***  0.041  0.115***  0.032  0.124***  0.050** 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
      0.092***  0.093***  0.092*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  8.370***  8.305***  8.006***  8.372***  8.308***  8.003***  8.391***  8.318***  8.016*** 
   (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.077)     (0.076)  (0.078)  (0.084)     (0.068)  (0.070)  (0.079) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes     No  No  No     Yes  Yes  Yes 
 0:          0.38  0.27  0.86     0.57  0.40  0.90     0.20  0.16  0.60 
 0:          0.83  0.99  0.94  0.79  0.97  0.93  0.67  0.86  0.86 
 0:          0.40  0.15  0.75  0.72  0.32  0.96  0.28  0.12  0.66 
 0:          0.00  0.01  0.46  0.00  0.01  0.43  0.00  0.01  0.31 
 0:          0.01  0.08  0.47  0.00  0.04  0.30  0.02  0.13  0.52 
 0:          0.00  0.00  0.35     0.00  0.01  0.33     0.00  0.00  0.33 
Observations  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915  3915 
    0.14  0.15  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.21  0.17  0.17  0.21 
The table gives estimation results obtained with the Bernard & Jensen (1999) methodology. Each column represents a separate regression where the 
dependent variable      OP is a function of dummy variables for foreign integration (  ), foreign outsourcing (  ), domestic integration (  ), domestic 
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